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SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CALIFORNIA
Although the United States Supreme Court held in Mapp v.
Ohio' that evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution was inadmissible in a state court as a matter
of constitutional compulsion, it laid down no fixed formula for
the determination of an illegal search and seizure. Basically, the
constitutional test of a lawful search and seizure is that it be made
pursuant to a validly issued search warrant or that it be incidental
to a lawful arrest. However, such a test is so broad that it can
provide only a framework for constitutional compliance. The
factual situation of a case may give rise to the application of a
more precise test. The courts may be required to determine first
whether there was a search and seizure, and, if so, whether it
was reasonable. The cases in which the legality of the search and
seizure are in issue usually involve lack of a search warrant, so that
the courts must ascertain if the search was incidental to a lawful
arrest. This requires the application of tests of "lawful arrest,"
which in turn must meet the standards of "probable cause." The
tests of probable cause are themselves complex. Moreover, the
search must still be "incidental to the arrest," which often in-
volves difficult concepts of time and distance.
Since the Mapp case the California courts have been faced
with the question of whether the state or federal standards of law-
ful search and seizure will control. In People v. Mickelson2 the
Supreme Court of California made it obvious that its determina-
tion in this area would not be governed by federal rules when it
stated:
A state rule governing police procedure is not unconstitutional
merely because it permits conduct in which a federal officer may not
lawfully engage. The Fourth Amendment itself sets forth no more than
the basic outlines of lawful law enforcement. It becomes meaningful in
specific situations only by reference to the common law and statutory
law governing the issuance of warrants, the authority of officers, and
the power to arrest. Illegally obtained evidence may be excluded by the
federal courts for various reasons .... Accordingly, before a state rule
governing police conduct may be struck down, it must appear that
neither Congress nor a state legislature could authorize it. If a state
adopts rules of police conduct consistent with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment and if its officers follow those rules, they do not
act unreasonably within the meaning of the amendment although dif-
ferent rules may govern federal officers.8
1 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 59 A.C. 465, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963).
3 Id. at 468-69, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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By the same token, a California court may disregard a finding
by a federal district court that the evidence sought to be admitted
was the product of an illegal search and seizure.4
The United States Supreme Court in its recent decision, Ker
v. State of California,' resolved any uncertainty as to whether
state standards had been superseded by federal rules and decisions:
[A]ithough the standard of reasonableness is the same under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the demands of our federal
system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmissible
because of our supervisory powers over federal courts and that held
inadmissible because prohibited by the United States Constitution. We
reiterate that the reasonableness of a search is in the first instance a
substantive determination to be made by the trial court from the facts
and circumstances of the case and in the light of the "fundamental
criteria" laid down by the Fourth Amendment and in opinions of this
Court applying that Amendment .... The States are not thereby pre-
cluded from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and
seizures to meet "the practical demands of effective criminal investiga-
tion and law enforcement" in the States, provided that those rules do
not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is in-
admissible against one who has standing to complain .... 6
WAS THERE A SEARCH?
Looking at the standards developed by the courts of California
in their determination of whether there has been a lawful search
and seizure, the most basic issue is whether there had been a search.
Observing that which is open and patent is not a search.
7
A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is con-
cealed and that the object searched for has been hidden or inten-
tionally put out of the way. While it has been said that ordinarily
searching is a function of sight, it is generally held that the mere
looking at that which is open to view is not a "search."
This definition was applied in Madris v. The Superior Court
of the State of California,' with the result that the district court
refused to find that a search had been made when an officer had
opened the door of the petitioner's automobile and discovered a
gun lying in the open glove compartment. The same test was applied
4 Castenada v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1962). Reversed on other
grounds, 59 A.C. 456, 380 P.2d 641, 30 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
5 83 Sup. Ct. 1623 (1963).
6 Id. at 1630.
7 People v. Earl, 216 A.C.A. 664, 31 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1963).
8 People v. Spicer, 163 Cal. App. 2d 678, 683, 329 P.2d 917, 920 (1958), quoting
from People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 219-220, 300 P.2d 729, 742 (1956).
9 218 A.C.A. 86, 32 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1963).
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in People v. Reed.10 The police had discovered a rope, previously
used to effect a robbery, protruding from under a boardwalk
leading to the front door of the defendant's home. Although the dis-
covery was made prior to the defendant's arrest, its admissibility as
evidence was upheld since it had not been obtained by a search.
WAS THE SEARCH REASONABLE?
Assuming that a search has been made, the court may be re-
quired to determine its reasonableness. A search is not unreasonable
merely because it was effected by looking through an open transom
or an existing aperture resulting from an ill-fitting door," or a tiny
hole drilled in the door of a hotel room'2 or apartment, 13 provided
that the officer himself did not drill the hole. 4 Moreover, it "has
been repeatedly held that looking through a window does not con-
stitute an unreasonable search."" Thus in People v. Murray" an
officer's observation of the defendant handling what appeared to be
marijuana, made through the unpainted portion of a window to a
men's room, was held not to violate any of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights. The court held that once "the officer observed the
defendant in possession of contraband, it was proper for him to
enter and arrest defendant for a felony which was committed in his
presence and he was therefore entitled to make the arrest without
a warrant."' 7
WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE?
The United States Supreme Court has held that probable
cause, the prerequisite of a lawful arrest without a warrant, exists
"where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed.
[Citations omitted.]""I However, the Court will still allow the law-
10 210 Cal. App. 2d 80, 26 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1962).
11 People v. Earl, 216 A.C.A. 664, 31 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1963).
12 People v. Regalado, 193 Cal. App. 2d 437, 14 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1961).
13 People v. Ruiz, 146 Cal. App. 2d 630, 304 P.2d 175 (1956).
14 People v. Earl, 216 A.C.A. 664, 31 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1963).
15 People v. Murray, 218 A.C.A. 335, 337, 32 Cal. Rptr. 348, 349 (1963), citing
as authority People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 296 P.2d 855 (1955); People v. Hen
Chin, 145 Cal. App. 2d 583, 303 P.2d 18 (1956); People v. Rayson, 197 Cal. App. 2d
33, 17 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1961).
16 218 A.C.A. 335, 32 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1963).
17 Id. at 338, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
18 Ker v. State of California, 83 Sup. Ct. 1630 (1963).
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fulness of arrests in California to be determined by the law of that
state. 9
In California, the courts adhere to the basic rules laid down in
People v. Torres,20 quoted with approval in People v. Cedeno:21
A search without a warrant is proper where it is incident to a lawful
arrest based on reasonable cause to believe that the accused has
committed a felony. Such a search is not rendered unlawful merely
because it precedes rather than follows the arrest. [Citations omitted.]
Reasonable or probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary care and
prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain an
honest and strong suspicion that the accused is guilty. The test is
not whether the facts on which the officer relies are sufficient to
convict, but only whether the person should stand trial. [Citations.]
In People v. Ingle,2 the supreme court of California stated
that good faith alone would not be held sufficient to justify an arrest
without a warrant. The law would look only at the facts and circum-
stances presented to the officer at the time he was required to act.
Admittedly, the interpretation of those facts presented the difficulty.
The court continued, unless "it can be said that prudent men in the
position of these officers knowing what they knew and seeing what
they did would not have had reasonable cause to believe and to
conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion that Ingle [the
defendant] was violating or had violated the law, the arrest should
be held lawful."2 3 It should be noted that the Ingle test is stated
in the negative. This gives the impression that the court will assume
reasonable cause, unless it is convinced from the facts that such
was not the case. Should the courts apply this test, it is possible to
argue that in a close case such an assumption would infringe upon
the requirements of due process. The existence of reasonable or
probable cause as a basis for a lawful arrest is a vital element in
testing the legality of the search. Would not such an assumption give
the State an unfair advantage by measureably lightening its burden
of proof and requiring the defendant to disprove that which was
never fully proven?
The Ingle and Torres courts defined reasonable cause as "a
state of facts that would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence
to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime."24 Probable cause was
defined as having more evidence for than against; it includes a
19 Id. at 1632.
20 56 Cal. 2d 864, 366 P.2d 823, 17 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1961).
21 218 A.CA. 229, 234035, 32 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250 (1963).
22 53 Cal. 2d 407, 348 P.2d 577, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1960).
23 Id. at 414, 348 P.2d at 581, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
24 Id. at 412, 348 P.2d at 580, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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mind to believe, but leaves room for doubt. 5 The Torres test
appears to be too weak, requiring as it does only strong suspicion.
The officer's belief is measured merely by what a man of ordinary
care and prudence would believe. This test does not recognize that
a police officer, normally a man of specialized training and ex-
perience, is qualified to exercise more than ordinary care and
prudence. The Ingle court further weakens this test by casting it in
the negative, as noted above. The test of probable cause is more
realistic and stringent, because it looks to the weight of evidence
rather than the suspicions of a hypothetical reasonable man. Al-
though it does not demand certainty of guilt, it does, at least, require
that the officer believe, rather than merely suspect, the guilt of the
person he proposes to arrest. However, it serves no useful purpose
to contrast these tests, since the courts appear to disregard the
distinction and refer to them interchangeably, whether they are
testing the legality of an arrest or of a search.
INFORMERS
One group of cases looks to the source of the officer's informa-
tion, namely, the police informer, to determine the existence of
reasonable or probable cause. The district court made an exhaustive
study of cases involving this problem in People v. Cedeno 6
The reliability of the informer goes to the very heart of the con-
cept of reasonable cause. Whether or not a police officer acts upon
reasonable cause, where he relies upon information given by an in-
former, depends, in each instance, upon whether the reliance on the
information was reasonable. . . . Accordingly, to justify reliance
on the information received it is now firmly established in this state
that the information must come from a reliable informant. [Citations
omitted.] The informer must be known to the officer to be reliable,
and must be a person whom the officer in good faith believes to be
trustworthy. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, an arrest and search
may be made solely on the basis of information received from a
single reliable informant.27
In making an arrest or search without a warrant, the police officer
may rely on information secured from an anonymous or unreliable
informant only in the case of a pressing emergency. The applicable
test is: "Considering all the information in the hands of the police,
would a reasonable police officer act on that information or would
a reasonable police officer seek further information before making
the arrest and conducting the search?128 In the Cedeno case the
25 Ibid.
26 218 A.C.A. 229, 32 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1963).
27 Id. at 234, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
28 Id. at 235, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
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defendant was convicted on evidence obtained without either a
search or arrest warrant. One of the grounds for reversal of this
conviction by the district court was that the state had failed to
show that the informant was reliable. Another ground was that the
illegal search and arrest were not made until approximately a
month after the police received the information. Thus, there were
lacking both the pressing emergency required to justify a search
or arrest based on information from an unreliable informant,29 and
any valid excuse for not obtaining a warrant.
SUSPICIOUS CONDUCT
Another group of cases holds that furtive or suspicious conduct
may satisfy the requirement of reasonable cause and justify arrest
without a warrant. The Cedeno case cites numerous examples of
conduct falling into this category.8 ° Such conduct may involve the
appearance or demeanor of the suspect, the way he drives his car
(e.g., driving too slowly, or too fast, or without lights), or attempts
to hide or dispose of the ubiquitous brown bag that seems to ac-
company narcotics addicts. While furtive gestures alone are in-
sufficient to justify an arrest or search without a warrant,3 the
Cedeno court came to the conclusion that "the California cases
clearly hold that information supplied by an informant who has
not proven reliable, may, when coupled with a defendant's furtive
or suspicious conduct, form a combination of elements that supplies
the grounds for probable cause for a search or arrest without a
warrant." 2
The Cedeno court makes no distinction between furtive and
suspicious conduct, and common sense would indicate that furtive
conduct is merely a species of suspicious behavior. However, a
recent case does draw the distinction by holding that furtive
gestures combined with suspicious circumstances or conduct are
sufficient to give rise to probable cause.3 The suspicious conduct
consisted of the defendant driving a car rapidly at 2:30 a.m. with-
out lights, making a U-turn, and getting out of the car after being
stopped instead of waiting for the police to come to him. The
furtive gesture consisted of placing or picking something off the
floorboard of the car. The "something" turned out to be a brown
paper bag, and since the officer knew marijuana is so packaged, his
search of the bag's contents was held justified.
29 Id. at 236, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
30 Id. at 240-42, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 253-54.
31 People v. Tyler, 193 Cal. App. 2d 728, 14 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1961).
32 People v. Cedeno, 218 A.C.A. 229, 242, 32 Cal. Rptr. 246, 255 (1963).
33 People v. One Chevrolet Impala, 219 A.C.A. 18, 33 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1963).
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On'the other hand, the apparent motioning of someone awayfrom a door and then slamming it in an officer's face was not such
suspicious conduct as would give rise to reasonable cause to believe
that the defendant was guilty of a felony. 4 The court observed:
There are many reasons other than guilt of a felony why an occupant
of an apartment may not wish himself or others present exposed to
the immediate view of a stranger, even if the stranger is a police officer.If refusal of permission to enter could convert mere suspicion of
crime into probable cause to arrest the occupant and search his home,
such suspicion alone would become the test of the right to enter, and
the right to be free from unreasonable police intrusions would be
vitiated by its mere assertion.85
It is suggested that this approach, as well as that taken by the
Cedeno court, which requires more than suspicious conduct as abasis for probable cause, are more conducive to the achievement
of the fundamental purposes of the search and seizure clause. Thepolice officer initially must determine whether the actor's conduct
is suspicious. His decision will be formed by his judgment of factual
circumstances attendant upon the incident. His judgment may be
colored by his experience, prejudices, and even the state of hisdigestion. The court then is left with the task of devising tests todetermine whether his judgment was sound. This is impossible since
in any given situation there may be present such intangible factors
to affect his judgment as the defendant's tone of voice, his hesitancy
or evasiveness in responding to questions, or a hostile attitude. The
officer's assessment of the situation may be correct. But how can a
court or jury determine the soundness of his judgment, not having
been present at the scene and being unable to ascertain the various
elements which must have entered into the exercise of the officer'sjudgment? If the court allows the existence of suspicious conduct
alone to serve as a sufficient basis for probable cause, then it is in
effect giving extraordinary weight to one man's judgment. The
fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures will not be protected by allowing the police such unchecked
power.
SURVEILLANCE
Probable cause may also be grounded on information obtained
through police surveillance. The court will distinguish between
"clandestine observations by police officers of premises devoted to
common use by the general public-such as, for example, the shop-
ping areas and public hallways and elevators of [a] department
84 Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 A.C. 75, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1963).
85 id. at 78, 378 P.2d at 115, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
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store.. ." and the surveillance of those places which are "ordinarily
understood to afford personal privacy to individual occupants."38
General exploratory searches will be condemned. The court's dis-
approval of the manner in which the surveillance was conducted
may result in the decision that an unreasonable search was made.
On the other hand, if the surveillance is proper, the discoveries
gained during its course may serve as grounds for probable cause
for a subsequent arrest.
37
It should also be noted that in California it has been "consis-
tently held that circumstances short of probable cause to make an
arrest may still justify an officer's stopping pedestrians or motorists
on the streets for questioning." ' In the interests of self-protection,
if the circumstances warrant it, the officer may require the occupant
to submit to a superficial search for concealed weapons. "Should the
investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, the
officer may arrest the suspect and conduct a reasonable incidental
search." 9
WAS THE SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO AN ARREST?
Whether the search in fact precedes or follows an arrest, it
"must be incidental to the arrest and contemporaneous therewith
as to time and integrated as to place."4 In Castenada v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County4 the defendant, apparently under
the influence of narcotics, was arrested at the home of a narcotics
user. Without a search warrant the police took the handcuffed
prisoner to three different homes, two occupied by his relatives and
one his own in an effort to locate his cache of narcotics. The court
found that the search was not incidental to his arrest. In another
case, the police, without a warrant, allegedly arrested the defendant
and searched him at his home. This was followed by a search of a
hotel room, also conducted without a search warrant. Because
of the distance of the second place searched from the place of the
purported arrest, the second search was found to be not incidental
to the arrest.42 In both of these cases, the fact that searches were
conducted at some distance from the place of the defendant's ap-
36 Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 472, 374 P.2d 817, 819, 24 Cal. Rptr.
849, 851 (1962).
87 See e.g., People v. Williams, 218 A.CA. 102, 32 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1963).
38 People v. Mickelson, 59 A.C. 465, 467, 380 P.2d 658, 660, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20
(1963).
39 Ibid.
40 Madris v. Superior Court, 228 A.C.A. 86, 91, 32 Cal. Rptr. 263, 267-68 (1963).
41 59 A.C. 456, 380 P.2d 641, 30 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
42 People v. Haven, 59 A.C. 738, 381 P.2d 927, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1963).
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prehension led to the conclusion that the search was not incidental
to the arrest and was illegal.
WAS THERE CONSENT?
Although evidence may have been obtained through an other-
wise illegal search and seizure, still it will be held admissible if the
court finds the defendant consented to the search.48 Such a doctrine
is subject to grave abuse and its application can severely strain the
bounds of credulity. For example, in the Castenada case the de-
fendant's conviction was affirmed on an intermediate appeal on
grounds that the defendant had consented to the search. The court
had found no difficulty in arriving at this conclusion, although the
evidence indicating that during the search the defendant had in-
quired at least twice whether the officers had a search warrant and
the police had admitted to him they had not; he was in custody and
handcuffed at the time; he had made repeated efforts to lead the
officers away from his cache of heroin as he was taken from home
to home over a space of several hours during the extended search.
The decision was reversed by the California supreme court, which
found it "abundantly clear that petitioner did not freely and volun-
tarily consent to the search. . . ."" The district court of appeal in the
Castenada case had indicated that the defendant's failure to object
to a search was evidence of consent.45 Had the decision stood, ille-
gally obtained evidence would have been admissible if implied con-
sent could be found in circumstances in which an individual is vir-
tually powerless to prevent the search.
The supreme court of Calfornia has significantly restricted the
doctrine of consent in its recent decision in People v. Haven.46
The facts of the case read like a comedy of errors. The police,
while keeping defendant's home under surveillance, observed the
entry of known narcotics users. The police delayed a week before
they made their search, which was conducted without a warrant,
although they could have obtained one in the interim. This was their
first error. Their second was to enter the defendant's home without
his consent, thereby making an illegal entry. Their third error was
to search the defendant without arresting him (or so it was alleged
and it appears the court so believed). The search of the defendant's
person produced a key to a hotel room, which under the circum-
stances the court held to be the product of an illegal search. The
48 See Note 3 SANTA CLARA LAW. 180 (1963).
44 Castenda v. Superior Court, 59 A.C. 456, 460, 380 P.2d 641, 643, 30 Cal. Rptr.
1, 3 (1963).
45 Castenda v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1962).
46 59 A.C. 738, 381 P.2d 927, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1963).
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next mistake was to take the defendant and his wife, neither pre-
sumably under lawful arrest, to the hotel room and there make
another search. This was held illegal on two grounds. Such search
was illegal since it was effected without a lawful arrest or a search
warrant. But, even assuming an arrest had been made, the second
search would still be illegal since it was conducted at some distance
from the place of arrest, and hence was not incidental to the arrest.
In the face of all this the police alleged the defendant had consented
to the search, and the evidence-the product of the second search
and seizure-was used to convict the defendant. The supreme court,
in reversing the conviction, ruled that although evidence obtained
by a search following an illegal arrest normally is inadmissible, it
may be admitted if the search was consented to, but that consent
must have been given before the illegal arrest took place. The court
expressly disapproved language in several cases which indicated that
consent given immediately after an unlawful arrest might validate
the search. A search and seizure made pursuant to consent secured
immediately following an illegal entry or arrest "is so inextricably
bound up with the illegal conduct" that such consent would not be
held to be voluntarily given, and the product of a search and seizure
under such circumstances would be inadmissible.4 7
Decisions such as those in the Haven and Cedeno cases are
laudable for their logic, precision and clarity. Thinking is apt to
become muddied in an area in which factual situations are so
variable and involved that merely to sort out the sequence of events
and place the pertinent facts in their proper prospective becomes a
feat in itself. No less difficult is it to apply tests which are often
vague and inconclusive. The court's deliberations may be further
complicated by its realization of the impact its decision will have.
Will it give credence to an over-zealous police officer who swears
the defendant consented to the search, when common sense indicates
the contrary to be the case? Or will the court brand the police con-
duct illegal and free an individual who was in fact caught red-
handed? What is the effect on the public, who may not understand
that more basic issues were in the balance than the vindication or
conviction of the particular defendant? Will the public lose confi-
dence in its courts and respect for the police? The court is bound
to render a decision which meets basic constitutional requirements.
Such requirements can best be met, and the individual's rights
safeguarded, when, as in the Haven case, a precise test can be laid
down, which the police readily understand and follow, and which
the courts can apply without a tortured interpretation of the facts.
Evelyn Magnes
47 Ibid.
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